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THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM AND
TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW THEORY
JAM s E.

STASRS*

Introduction
Some years have passed since last I travelled through the
Mark Twain country of Southern Illinois. On that last occasion,
I -was charged to investigate the operation of the then newly
enacted ten percent bail statute. In connection with my investigation, I met with local sheriffs whose authority gave them
particular control over the implementation of the bail legislation. The memory of an encounter with one such sheriff is particularly fresh, illuminating and pertinent to this discussion.
Like others of his brethren, this sheriff took the liberty, upon
the occasion of my official visit, to acquaint me with those matters which troubled him most and in which the Illinois legislative
assistance to him had been minimal. One such complaint derived from the lack of a statute in Illinois punishing public
intoxication as a crime. As I recall, this sheriff was decidedly
emphatic in his denunciation of the legislature for failing to
heed the requirements of public safety and, to use a term of current coinage, in "handcuffing" the operations of his office. The
public intoxication void was, as he viewed it, a menace to the
community and to him as a sheriff.
He illustrated his problem by describing a common occurrence
-the finding of a person late at night in an alcoholic stupor
behind the wheel of a parked car. "Without a public intoxication statute," the sheriff complained, "I cannot effect an arrest
and prevent the strong possibility of danger to the drunk or
others when he awakes and drives off." lie could not, he said,
stand idly by and wait until the drunk regained consciousness
in view of the other duties which commanded his attention, nor
could he arrest the drunk for driving while intoxicated since the
Illinois Supreme Court, unlike the courts of some other states,
had held that a car with its motor off is not being driven. The
predicament of law enforcement seemed insoluable.
"What," I inquired innocently, "do you, as a matter of practice, do in such a case?" "Well," the sheriff answered, breaking
* Associate Professor; George Washington University School of Law,
Washington, D. C.
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into a smile, "I simply unholster my revolver, bang it down hard
on the roof of the car and when the occupant awakens in anger
and fright I arrest him for disorderly conduct tending to annoy
me and break my peace." A most resourceful and imaginative
response to what one sheriff viewed as a legislative oversight.
Since that time, I have come to realize more fully that the
police are uniquely adaptable to the changed rules that legislative or judicial supervision may force upon them. In view of
this versatility, I have no doubt that the Robinson-DriverEaster' triptych (and aborted Budd case2 ) will not cause a
breakdown in law enforcement efforts nor that they will occasion alarm or danger to the law abiding citizen.
Nevertheless, I am seriously troubled over the possible impact
that these decisions will exert upon traditional criminal law
theory. My fear is not one which arises from a sentimental or
unreasoning attachment to notions which have become fossilized
by age or inattention nor to the unreality of theory too abstract
for the marketplace. On the contrary, I am convinced that the
inveterate and basic premises of criminal law theory are indisputably and unalterably correct and that they are singularly
suited to the cases which, like Driver and Easter, quicken the
pulse and the law. Indeed, I am fearful lest a change in the
fundamental structure of criminal law theory will work manifest injustice in the particular cases which worry the courts and
the practitioners before them.
Such an extreme dose of anxiety requires documentation.
Robinson v. Caiforniais a convenient exordium, if only because
it preceded Easter and Driver. Robinson determined that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
precludes the conviction of a narcotic addict for the offense of
addiction. Robinson, however, did more than that. It for the
first time bound the several states to the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment by incorporating it into
the fundamental fairness conceptions of due process implicit in
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. That incorporation, to those of us who have watched the Supreme Court's grad1. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Driver v. Hinnant, 350
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
2. Budd v. California, 385 U.S. 909 (1966); cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 209

(1966).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/7

2

Concept
of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law Th
THEDisease
DisEAsE
CoNCEPT oF ALcoHowswT
19671 Starrs: The

ual enlargement of the meaning of due process over the past few
years, was inevitable and, I believe, desirable.
In applying the cruel and unusual punishment clause to the
states, Robinson also gave new content and meaning to that
clause. As it now appears, the clause has been broadened in the
incorporation. Previous cases had limited the clause to punishments which were either inherently cruel to the extent that they
degrade the humanity of man8 or which were excessive because
grossly disproportionate to the offense committed. 4 Never before
had the clause been used to restrict the legislative prerogative
to declare what conduct shall be criminal.
Of previous cases, only Trop v. Dulles5 gave any forewarning
of the extension which was to come in Robinson. That opinion
declared the punishment of denationalization for the capital
offense of wartime desertion to be cruel and unusual. Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the majority affirmed the elasticity of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, a clause which
the Chief Justice said "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." 6 This pronouncement was all the more striking since,
in disapproving denationalization as a punishment for wartime
desertion, the court implicitly approved capital punishment for
that offense. In other words, it was not only the intrinsic nature
of the punishment or the method of its exaction which was,
thereafter, to be the linchpin to determine whether the penalty
was cruel and unusual. A new standard, relying upon the dignity of man in contemporary society, had been drawn. With
such fluidity to work with, the Robinson aftermath was ineluctable assuming no drastic movements in the philosophy or membership of the Supreme Court.
Once extend, however, a constitutional precept and the ingenuity and tenacity of lawyers makes it extremely difficult to
3. In. re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (dictum); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1878) (dictum). See, generally comment, Revival of Eighth Amendinent: Development of Cruel Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16
STAN. L. Rxv. 996 (1964).

4. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323 (1892) (dissenting opinions). See generally, Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv.
635 (1966).
5. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
6. Id. at 101.
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retreat from fresh extensions. Thus it was not unexpected that,
in 1963, the Supreme Court should have been petitioned to review a capital sentence imposed upon an Alabama Negro for
rape.7 The theory of the petitioner was, of course, that the punishment was cruel and unusual since, on the analysis of Ar.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Robinson, capital punishment for rape does not serve the legitimate objectives of
the criminal law. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a
rehearing, but the then Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote a dissent in
which he asked: "Can the permissible aims of punishment ...
be achieved as effectively by punishing rape less severely than
by death.. . if so, does the imposition of the death penalty for
rape constitute unnecessary cruelty?'
These inquiries would have been unnecessary if the Supreme
Court in Robinson had not, in the words of Lon Fuller, "needlessly [taken] on its shoulders a general responsibility . . . for

making the punishment fit the crime." 9 If the Robinson decision did presage such an extraordinary investigation into the
relationship of punishments to crimes, then Robinson is, to that
extent, a retrogression to long discarded penological notions.
Contemporary correctional theory teaches that individualization
of punishments to the needs of particular offenders should be
the yardstick by which just punishments are determined. The
entire Juvenile Court movement exemplifies this penological
approach. Recent federal legislation, like the Narcotic Addict
Rehabilitation Control Act of 196610 reaffirms this view. Judge
Butler, in his District Court opinion in the Driver case," was
right, then, in describing it as a "novel position" for petitioner
to argue that the punishment should fit the crime rather than
"be adjusted to the individual."
The seeds of new extensions for judicially refashioned precepts
are diverse and well-nigh uncontrollable. For this reason, courts
must exercise considerable restraint in the language they use in
pouring old wine into new bottles. A carelessly dropped phrase
or a suggestion in dictum can be the cause of tomorrow's litiga-

tion, or, what is worse, of today's misunderstanding concerning
7. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
8. Id. at 891.
9. L. FULLER, THE MoRALiTY OF LAW 105 (1964).
10. U. S. CODE CONG. &ADM. NEws 1670 (1966).

11. Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
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the exact scope of the redefinition. An aside by Mr. Justice
Stewart in Robinson illustrates the necessity for keeping a tight
rein on judicial language.
After asserting, with the flavor of a coup de grace, that even
the State of California admits "that narcotics addiction is an
illness," Justice Stewart adds, I believe unnecessarily: "Indeed,
it is apparently an illness which can be contracted innocently or
involuntarily.'12 Of what importance was it to the issues under
consideration to comment that narcotics addiction can be contracted "innocently or involuntarily"? As a fact, that is true,
but is Mr. Justice Stewart suggesting that there may be occasions when the illness of narcotics addiction can be voluntarily
and culpably induced? Some courts have taken the cue from
these words and held that the Robinson rationale will not apply
to exculpate those who are voluntary addicts. 18
On the other hand, is it possible to construe this reference to
innocence and involuntariness as giving the criminal law concept of mens rea or the guilty mind a constitutional dimension?
The briefs of counsel for Driver and Easter confirm this view
of Mr.Justice Stewart's language. But more of that hereafter.
In my estimation, Mr. Justice Stewart employed the questioned phraseology merely to fortify his position that convicting
one for what is an illness would be unjust. The injustice is
aggravated in those cases, rare though they may be, where the
illness is involuntarily or innocently contracted.
The one extension of Robinson, which is bound to bear most
heavily on the courts in the days to come, is that which arises
from using it as authority in any case where an illness finds its
outlet in criminal behavior. It is one thing to say that an illness
cannot be the basis for criminal guilt. It is another thing to say
that the criminal products of that illness are not punishable.14
A narcotics addict might argue that his possession of narcotics
was merely a compulsive symptom of his underlying sickness. 15
Judge Wright, in the District of Columbia, in passing on such
12. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
13. State v. Margo, 40 N.J. 188, 191 A. 2d 43 (1963).
14. And that is precisely what ensued when North Carolina denied leave to
a homosexual to raise this defense to a sodomy charge. Perkins v. North
Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
15. The argument was recently made and rejected in People v. Borrero and

Walton, 19 N.Y.2d 332, 280 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1967).
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a contention in a recent case' 6 said that "that argument, although
neither remote nor insubstantial, is one which, in the light of
the great weight of the cases which have imposed such punishment, is more properly to be made to the Supreme Court."' 7
Neither Judge Wright nor his judicial colleagues felt compelled
to pass the onus of responsibility to the Supreme Court when
the Easter case came before them, even though the issue there
was a parallel one. One need not engage in wildeyed speculation
to be able to assert that further extensions of Robinson to, say,
burglaries and robberies by narcotics addicts or chronic alcoholics will be most grudgingly made and then within the narrowest of confines.'
Various devices and arguments exist for thwarting the onward
thrust of -Robinson.
It could be argued, as Mr. Hutt has done, 19 that "universal
and invariable symptoms" of alcoholism are exempt from criminal punishment. This theory provides the occasion for asserting
that robbery by an alcoholic is not a "universal and invariable
symptom" but that public intoxication is. Yet, it is a commonly
known fact that the housewife alcoholic is the submerged or
invisible alcoholic in view of her rare appearances in public in
that condition.
20
It could also be argued, again after the fashion of Mr. Hut,
that alcoholics are protected from criminality by their alcoholism only when the crimes they commit occur during a siege of
intoxication. If the crime occurs during a "lucid interval", then
chronic alcoholism would not be available to exculpate. This
argument has the support of the draftsmen of the Model Penal
Code 2 ' where narcotics addiction is declared to be a defense,
under the heading of intoxication, to crimes committed only
during the use of drugs.
16. Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

17. Id. at 495.
18. This prognostication has proved to be accurate. See District of Columbia v. Phillips, Cr. Nos. D.C. 854, 5-67 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sessions, Crim. Div.,
4/26/67) as reprinted in 113 Cong. Rec. H. 5584 (May 16, 1967) (daily ed.)
where chronic alcoholism was held to be unavailable as a defense to disorderly
conduct (abusive language).
19. Amicus Brief for Defendant at 59, People v. Hoy, 143 N.W.2d 577
(Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
20. Id. at 60.
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (3) (a) (Tent Draft 9, 1959).
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Another method of delaying the growth of Robinson would be
to argue that it applies only to crimes of status such as public
intoxication, when committed by a chronic alcoholic, or vagrancy
or even disorderly conduct. Crimes of status are objectionable
on their own footing without regard to any cruel and unusual
punishment rationale. They tend to be vague in defining the
prohibited conduct; they tend to dispense with the requirements
of act and intent which are generally accepted pre-conditions to
criminal guilt and, worst of all, they are most susceptible to
abusive police arrest practices. The Supreme Court, and particularly Mr. Justice Douglas, has often and strongly disparaged
and sometimes dispatched such statutes.
Such a status crime argument would be most telling and effective if Robinson were to be extended to include other crimes
committed by narcotic addicts and alcoholics. It might be argued
that homosexuality is a sickness,12 so that the consensual acts of
homosexuals could not be punished. Robinson, then would make
the Illinois statute legalizing homosexuality between consenting
adults in private unnecessary. Or voyeurism might be considered
to be pathological so that the South Carolina peeping tom
statute, for example, which punishes such acts by up to three
years imprisonment,2 3 would be, as a constitutional mandate,
inapplicable to such persons.
Yet, none of these problems would trouble us today if the
Supreme Court in Robinson had exercised the restraint which
its self imposed policies of constitutional abstention dictate. One
such policy impedes the development of new constitutional
theory by requiring that the constitutional issue be avoided
wherever alternative grounds for a decision exist. These alternatives may be either of established constitutional dimensions or
of a non-constitutional nature. May I suggest that the Robinson
court could have decided that the conviction of an addict for his
addiction was to deprive him of equal protection of the laws.
The thrust of the argument is that one form of sickness, i.e.,
addiction, is being singled out for specialized and criminal attention. This, I submit, does not square with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. My Illinois sheriff may
22. See Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
23. S. C. CODE ANN. § 16-554 (1962)
OxrA. STAT. § 21-1021 (1961).
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have been annoyed by a legislative oversight, but I am perplexed by a judicial outreaching.
Whereas Robinson's progeny is confusion, the parentage of
Easter and Driver is a miasma of misconceptions concerning
traditional criminal law theory. Driver,I admit, is not all that
bad for it, by chance, found its end in the federal courts where,
by the nature of things, constitutional issues had to take priority. This refusal of the federal constitutional violation compelled the court in Driver to follow the Robinson logic or to
strike out on its own into other federal constutional issues. The
Driver court chose to mark time with Robinson and, therefore,
decided that the cruel and unusual punishment clause required
the acquittal of a chronic alcoholic charged by the North Carolina authorities with public intoxication.
However, Judge Bryan, speaking for the three judges in
Driver, did make an excursion beyond the range of constitutional precepts into traditional criminal law theory when he
said:
Although his [Driver's] misdoing objectively comprises
the physical elements of a crime, nevertheless, no crime has
been perpetrated because the conduct was neither actuated
by an evil intent nor accompanied with a consciousness of
wrongdoing, indispensable ingredients of a crime. Norrisette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250-252 (1952). Nor can his
misbehavior be penalized as a transgression of a police regulation-malum prohibitum-necessitating no intent to do
what it punishes. The alcoholic's presence in public is not
his act, for he did not will it. It may be likened to the
movements of an imbecile or a person in a delirium of a
fever. None of them by attendance in the forbidden place
defy the forbiddance.24
This language is, to me, a criminal law professor, the language
of love. It possesses the magic and the majesty of traditional
criminal law theory. In essence, what it says is that every crime
is comprised of two elements-the act and the intent-and that
neither element can exist in the face of chronic alcoholism.
It is possible, of course, that Judge Bryan's remarks go further. They may be an attempt to give federal constitutional dig24. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966).
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nity to these principles of criminal law. If so, I applaud the
effort but announce its present futility. Other cases before the
Supreme Court have made similarly valiant efforts to house
these criminal law principles in the tabernacle of constitutional
theory. Success has been momentary, short-lived, or incomplete.
Observe the Lambert case,-2 5 another product of California
vintage. Mrs. Lambert had been convicted for failing to register
under a Los Angeles ordinance requiring convicted felons to
register. She claimed that she was completely unaware of the
registration requirement. The Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Douglas, said that her ignorance of this law could
not in consonance with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, be disregarded. As a consequence, her conviction
was reversed, to the applause of most criminal law professors.
Now, and at last, it was thought, the principle of criminal intent
had been elevated to a constitutional level. The thought was a
delusion and the passing years have demonstrated that Mr. Justice Frankfurter was right-Lamberthas become "a derelict on
the waters of the law." 26 Other cases have come along, to
assault the promontory but constitutional law and criminal law
theory have consistently refused to coalesce.
Like Driver, De Witt Easter was convicted of public intoxication and the D.C. Court of Appeals determined that chronic
alcoholism was a defense to that crime. But, unlike Driver, the
decision in Easter did not have to rest on a federal constitutional
base since the District of Columbia is, as far as its criminal law
system is concerned, equivalent to any one of the several states.
Consequently, there was more latitude in Easter for arguments
of a non-constitutional dimension. Therefore, it was not surprising to find four judges holding that the Robinson rationale was
applicable and four other judges deciding that criminal law
theory alone would exonerate Easter. The actual holding of the
case was "that the public intoxication of a chronic alcoholic
lacks the essential element of criminality; and to convict such a
person of that crime would also offend the Eighth Amendment." 27 Such an alternative statement of a holding is not unusual in complex cases where the pastime of judicial logrolling
eventuates in a unanimous decision.
25. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
26. Id. at 232 (Franldurter, J. dissenting).
27. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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The criminal law theory which moved the court in Easter was
stated by Judge Fahy as follows:
An essential element of criminal responsibility is the ability
to avoid the conduct specified in the definition of the crime.
Action within the definition is not enough. To be guilty of
the crime a person must engage responsibly in the action.
...In the case of a chronic alcoholic.., he cannot be held
to be guilty of the crime of being intoxicated because ...
he has lost the power of self-control in the use of intoxicating beverages. In his case an essential element of criminality, where personal conduct is involved, is lacking. This
element is referred to in the law as the criminal mind....2

On the face of it, Judge Fahy's analysis merely restates the
earlier quote from Judge Bryan's opinion in Driver. But the
resemblance is more apparent than real. A careful reading of
the full opinion in Easter along with counsel's briefs reveals
that the Easter court emphasized the involuntary aspects of a
chronic alcoholic's conduct, which involuntariness the court
equated with the intention or guilty mind requisite to criminal
guilt. The Driver court, however did not merge the requirement
that an act be voluntary with the criminal intent element.
What, you might reasonably inquire, is amiss about this concrescence of voluntariness and intent? Is my insistence and that
of the Driver court that they be kept distinct merely the maunderings of academic nonesuch?
Permit me to put two hypothetical cases to you. One involves
what might be described as a common law crime or mdlum in se
since it combines the elements of act and intent. The other concerns a crime of a regulatory nature, called by the Driver court
malu m prohibitum because it dispenses with the element of intent and punishes an act alone.
Suppose, upon returning home one evening, a short-tempered
husband goes into the kitchen to find his wife and to discover
what the dinner will be. Upon learning that it is to be liver
again, he decides to vent his spleen by striking his wife. Before
he can do so, however, the hand which he had rested on the hot
stove becomes so painful that, as a reflex, he pulls it away only
to strike his wife accidentally in doing so. Is the husband guilty
28. Id. at 54.
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of the crime of battery upon his wife? According to traditional
criminal law theory, certainly not, for the act of striking his
wife was not his voluntary choice even though at that very moment he had intended to strike her. It is the voluntary act that is
lacking, not the criminal intent. Under the Easter rationale,
however, since the act occurred and it was accompanied by consciousness of wrongdoing, guilt must follow. This is the inevitable result of merging voluntariness with intent so that voluntariness loses its separate identity.
And now a second case, less supposititious than the first. Suppose the same husband is driving home from a day's work. He is
driving carefully in every respect and he has no cause for any
premonition of danger. Suddenly and unexpectedly, he loses
consciousness, drives through a stop sign and into a telephone
pole where he comes to a halt. Is he guilty of the traffic offense
of passing a stop sign? Under traditional criminal law theory,
certainly not since, in spite of the statute's elimination of the
intent requirement, it still must be proved that he was driving
voluntarily when he went through the traffic signal. Of course,
he was not acting voluntarily since unconsciousness had rendered
him powerless to make a free choice on the matter. Under the
Easterrationale, however, he would be guilty since voluntariness
is merely an adjunct of consciousness of wrongdoing, which is
not necessary of proof in this case. Consequently, the elimination of intent forces the elimination of voluntariness and results
in an unjust conviction.
On the possibility that your blood has not warmed to these
hypotheticals, permit me to cite to you a 1966 decision of the
Court of Appeals of Michigan, People v. Hoy2 9 by name. Hoy
had been convicted of being a disorderly person solely upon
proof of his public intoxication and, as a third offender, sentenced to one and one-half to two years in prison. On appeal
from the denial of his motion for a new trial, Hoy's counsel
argued that, as a chronic alcoholic, his client was unable to exercise self-control over his imbibing or appearances in public
places while drunk. The argument fell on barren ground for the
appellate court replied: "The statute makes the mere performance of the act an offense; hence the issue of voluntariness is
not present." 0
29. 143 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966).
30. Id. at 578.
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The language of the Hoy court is essentially the language of
the Easter decision and results from the divorcing of the aspect
of voluntariness from the requisite criminal act and the aligning, indeed the consolidation, of it with the criminal intent
requirement. Syllogistically, the argument runs along these
lines:
First syllogism:
MAJOR: 1. Criminal intent includes as one of its definitional
elements the matter of voluntariness.
MINOR:

2. A chronic alcoholic lacks voluntariness.

CONCLUSION: 3. A chronic alcoholic lacks the criminal intent required for conviction.
This is the logic of the Easter decision. Now follow it to its
enevitable terminus in the Hoy decision.
Second syllogism:
MAJOR: 1. Chronic alcoholics lack voluntariness.
MINOR: 2. Voluntariness (as defined in the syllogism to be an
integral part of criminal intent) is not relevant to a charge
for public intoxication.
CONCLUSION: 3. Chronic alcoholics cannot be exempt from
a conviction for public intoxication simply because they lack
voluntariness.
The Ioy case or the second syllogism, whichever you prefer,
results in the conviction of chronic alcoholics for the offense of
public intoxication. But the genesis for this unjust consequence
lies in the Easter decision's refusal to give separate vitality to
the concept of voluntariness.
Evidently, if unfortunate results, like Hoy, are to be avoided
and the non-penal approach to alcoholism, manifested by Easter,
encouraged it is extremely necessary to be vigilant and exacting
in our application of the basic tenets of traditional criminal law
theory. The basics are many, but the ones at issue in connection
with this problem can be narrowed to two-the criminal act and
the criminal mind, or as they are familiarly known among criminal trial lawyers, the actus reus and the mens rea. But once give
a lawyer a little learning in Latin and he tends, like those of the
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medical profession, to write his prescriptions thereafter in evermore-elaborate Latin phrases. Accordingly, the principle of
mens rea has been rendered into actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea (or, translated, the act is not culpable unless the mind is
culpable). Actus reus has become cogitationis poenam nemo
patitur (or, translated, no one is punishable for his thoughts
alone). In combination, these two principles of mens rea and
actus mus constitute the passe partout to the body of traditional
criminal law theory.
In their evolution a kind of Gresham's theorem has seemingly
been operative. Although both principles are, prima facie, (you
see, once start with Latin and there is no end) entitled to equal
weight, the principle of mens rea has tended to be the focus of
most of the scholarly commentaries and judicial decisions. Actus
reus, although always in circulation, has only rarely been accorded the equal protection of scholarly attention. One might
almost think that mens rea had the greater intrinsic value.
Discussions of the subject of mens rea often begin with or, at
least cannot omit reference to, Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in
Morissette v. U.S., 31 a 1952 Supreme Court opinion which gave
substance to the principle by permitting "an honorably discharged veteran" to assert that he did not know that the spent
bomb casings which he was charged with stealing from the government were not abandoned. The federal statute Morrissette
was charged with violating was interpreted to require proof that
the bomb casings were taken with a guilty mind. To Mr. Justice
Jackson the principle of mens rea was "no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil."13 2 Indeed, it was determined to be so fundamental that
criminal statutes which merely reenact common law crimes were
to be considered as implicitly incorporating a mens rea requirement even without express language to that effect.
fonissette, however, did not impinge upon the equally wellestablished, albeit often criticized, notion that certain crimes,
generally of a regulatory nature, such as traffic offenses or food
and drug laws, may dispense with proof of any mens rea. One
31. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
32. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (footnotes omitted).
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may be guilty of driving his car with an inoperative tail-light
even though he was not personally at fault in doing so. One of
my favorite cases in this field involves the prosecution33 of fish
retailers in New York City for selling plain old Mississippi
spoonbill as, and at the price of, the more costly sturgeon. The
retailers alleged that they were as much in the dark as their customers as to the difference between the two species. In fact,
they showed that only a chemical analysis of the fish would
enable them to ascertain which was sturgeon and which was
Mississippi spoonbill. Nevertheless, conviction followed. It was
either stop selling sturgeon and lose valued customers or engage
a chemist full-time and pay dearly.
Such hard cases prove why "strict criminal liability has never
achieved respectability in our law."3 4 But because such offenses

"serve mightily the convenience of the prosecutor '3 5 in obtaining
quick and easy convictions, they remain to irk the public and to
taunt us law professors.
Is the offense of public intoxication one of the regulatory
offense genre?. The Hoy case, in declaring mens rea to be irrelevant, so classifies it. The Easter case is to the contrary, but on
the flimsiest of grounds. Nowhere in Easter is there a thoroughgoing discussion of the nature of regulatory offenses and the
relation of public intoxication to them. The court assumes
throughout that public intoxication is of the mens rea variety.
The assumption is apparently predicated on a dictum in one of
the many Dallas 0. -Williamscases88 in the District which suggests that the defense of insanity would be admissible on a
prosecution for public intoxication. Any such reliance upon the
tangled skein of complicated cases that comprise the Williams
constellation is a thin reed upon which to rest the mens rea principle. Furthermore, this decision is a far cry from saying that
the prosecution must prove the defendant knew he was drunk
and knew he was drunk in public. Indeed, it would all but abolish a public intoxication statute for the accused to be allowed to
defend that he did not know his condition or where he was.
Prosecutional convenience, the touchstone of the regulatory of33. Unfortunately, it is unreported.
34. L. FULLER, THE MoAMunY OF LAW 77 (1964).
35. Id. at 78.
36. Williams v. District of Columbia, 147 A.2d 773 (Mun. Ct. App. 1959);
Williams v. United States, 102 App. D.C. 51, 250 F.2d 19 (1957).
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fense, compels the exclusion of mens Pea from the crime of public
intoxication.
Whereas mens rea finds an unsettled refuge in criminal law
theory, in view of the regulatory offense category, the requirement that criminal culpability depends upon the commission of
an act or the omission to act has all the stature of unblemished
tradition behind it. In short, actus reus is an element of almost
all crimes, even regulatory offenses. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon defense counsel in public intoxication and other cases to
use this knowledge to his client's advantage.
The statement of a definition, to those of us who have been
schooled in the scholastic tradition, often has a nice way of
choosing terms and conditions which solve the problems the
definer most fears from the request to propound a definition.
So it is with actus reus. We need not, however, hesitate long
over the meaning of "'eus".This word merely signifies that the
only relevant acts which may be criminal are those which are
prohibited by law. On the other hand, "actus" is a portmanteau
(and I might add, idiopathic) word including the act and the
volition which moves the actor to perform the act. According
to Holmes, 3t an act "is a muscular contraction and something

more. A spasm is not an act. The contraction of the muscles
must be willed." Others would broaden the meaning of actus to
cover those muscular movements which are willed by the actor
as well as some reference to the surrounding circumstances and
the consequences of the movement. This analysis gives the act
the three branches the Clown in Hamlet said it has, but the perspective here is stated as a matter of law, not jest.
In any event, it is clear that there are two aspects of a person's
state of mind which must be separately considered in any criminal case. They are:
1. the volition which impels the conduct; and
2. the realization and willing acceptance of the consequences
that may attend that conduct.
Hens rea has often been used to embrace both of these mental
states and so it was in Easter and Hoy, but not, I remind you,
in Driver. This "confusion of thought" and "complexity of
exposition" results from a failure to keep the distinction between
37. 0. HoTMEs, TiE CoMMoN LAW 53-54 (1881).
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the two clear; "nor can it be said that the ancient lawyers were
, 8
more successful in this matter than we have been ....
Glanville Williams, as usual, states the case best. In his work,
Oriminal Law-The GeneraZ Part,he says:
As a general rule, a crime is composed of actus reus and
mens rea, and both of these are necessary to constitute a
crime....

In this terminology, a surgeon who without in-

tention (or even negligence) causes his patient to die on the
operating table commits the actus reus of murder, though he
is not guilty of murder. He commits an act that would,
given the requisite intention, be murder.... Suppose that
D puts an aspirin in P's tea thinking that it is the sweetening tablet for which P has asked. This act is innocent, it
harms no one; yet it is the actus reus of attempt to murder.
For if D intended to poison P, and believed that an aspirin
would kill, his administration of it would be an attempt to
murder....89

Actual cases attest to the distinction between the mental state
called voluntariness which we assign to the principle of actus
reus and the mental state which we describe as mens rea. Most
of these decisions are of the regulatory offense class since it is
there, in the absence of mens rea, that the independent value of
voluntariness can best be perceived.
In Kilbride v. Lake, a 1962 opinion of the Supreme Court of
New Zealand,40 (a country, I might add, of common law heritage) defendant had been charged with a violation of the Traffic Regulation Act in that he had operated a vehicle which did
not have a "warrant of fitness" sticker attached to the windshield. The facts established that defendant had obtained the
sticker, affixed it to the windshield, operated the car, but, upon
leaving it unattended the sticker was unaccountably removed.
The New Zealand Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction,
stated:
38. Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CA=s. L.J.
31 (1936).
39. G. WILLA s, CrImINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART 642 (2d ed. 1961);
See also, Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J.
645 (1917).
40. [1962] N.Z.L.R. 590, noted in 25 MoD. L. REv. 741 (1962).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss3/7

16

Disease
Concept
of Alcoholism
and Traditional Criminal Law Th
Tnm
DisEAsE,
CONCEPT
OF ACoHoLmsm
1967] Starrs: The

[Ilt is a cardinal principle that, altogether apart from the
mental element of intention or knowledge of the circumstances, a person cannot be made criminally responsible for
an act or omission unless it was done or omitted in circumstances where there was some other course open to him. If
this condition is absent, any act or omission must be involuntary, or unconscious or unrelated to the forbidden event
in any causal sense regarded by the law as involving responsibility.

41

The New Zealand court's analysis would have avoided the
anomalous result in Larsonneur, a 1933 English case. 42 Mrs.
Larsonneur, an alien visiting England on a permit, was declared
to be persona non grata and went to the Irish Free State, where
she was arrested for illegal entry and handed over to the English
authorities who proceeded to charge and convict her for being
found unlawfully in England. On appeal, her conviction was
affirmed on the theory that the offense was regulatory and thus
that mens rea was irrelevant. The language of the appellate
court's opinion is reminiscent of the Hoy decision from Michigan where, you will recall, the same lack of insight resulted in
the affirmance of a conviction for public intoxication. Now
after our world tour we return to cases from the courts of this
country. There are two that immediately come to mind-Martin
'v. State, a 194 Alabama opinion, 43 and State v. Miller, a 1966
44
Louisiana case.

In Martin, a conviction for being drunk and disorderly in a
public place was reversed upon a showing that the police had
forcibly taken defendant from his home into the street where
the arrest then occurred. The court gave short shrift to the appeal, stating that the statute required proof of a "voluntary
appearance" and that the facts belied the exercise of any choice
by defendant.
Miller is a bit more involved but the principle is the same.
There defendant, the operator of an automobile, was stopped by
two police deputies, forced to connect up the wires to a radio in
his car and then charged and convicted of violating an ordinance
41.
42.
43.
44.

[1962] N.Z.L.R. 590, as quoted at 25 Mon. L. REv. 741, 742-743 (1962).
Rex v. Larsonneur, 24 Cir. App. R. 74, 149 L.T. 542 (1933).
31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (1944).
187 So. 2d 461 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
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against monitoring the radio frequency used by the sheriff. Once
again, the appeal resulted in a reversal, in which the court said,
somewhat cryptically, "the record does not contain evidence
upon which to predicate a finding of guilty."4 5
The lessons of these decisions are varied and arguable, but, for
my purposes, they plainly assert the necessity of addressing
criminal conduct according to a logical sequence which puts
considerations of aotus reus before issues of mens rea. In this
way, further encroachments of regulatory offenses upon traditional criminal law theory will be stifled and confusion of actus
reus with mnens rea will be thwarted. It was explicitly recognized in Kilbride v. Lake that the "elementary principle [of
actus reus] obviously involves the proof of something which goes
behind any subsequent and additional inquiry that might become
necessary as to whether mnen8 rea,must be proved as well. Until
that initial proof [of actus reus] exists arguments concerning
mens rea are premature." 40
The significance of actus reus pervades all crimes; not only
regulatory offenses. We should not be surprised, therefore, to
find that a new defense has recently developed as a counterpart
to the defense of insanity. Insanity exonerates because it negates
the mens rea. The new-found defense of automatism negatives
"the essential condition of the accused's bodily movements being
voluntary,14 7 or, in short, the actus reus.
Automatism is a remarkably useful defense, at least where the
courts are persuaded that it is not feigned, because, unlike the
defense of insanity, an acquittal based upon it will not work an
automatic committal to an institution for treatment. It was this
fear of a mandatory and open-ended commitment to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia which led counsel in
the Easter case to forego the defense of insanity.
Automatism finds its most frequent usage where there is an
indication of loss of consciousness. Thus sudden and unaccountable unconsciousness while one is driving may exculpate for the
otherwise criminal harms committed during its onset. Sleepwalkers are another category of recognized automatons.48 Prob45. Id. at 463.

46. [1962] N.Z.L.R. 590, as quoted at 25 MOD. L. REv. 741, 743 (1962).
47. Beck, Voluntary Conduct: Automatism, Insanity and Drunkenness, 9
Cru. L. Q. 315 (1967); Edwards, Automatism and Social Defense, 8 CIxm.
L. Q. 258 (1966); Edwards, Automatism and Criminal Conduct, 21 MOD. L.

Rzv. 375 (1958); Prevezer, Automaism and Involuntary Conduct, 1958 C1tim.
L. R. 361, 440.
48. WILLIAYS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENmEAL PAr 483 (2d ed. 1961).
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ably the most dramatic of all sleepwalking cases occurred in the
Australian case of Cogdo?4 9 where the accused dreamt that her
daughter was being sexually assaulted by hordes of soldiers.
The mother, still in sleep, located an axe, and after the fashion
of Raskolnikov, dispatched her daughter, thinking to save her
from further harm.
Other instances of automatism abound. 50 In one case, 51 a
charge of shopbreaking was dismissed upon proof that the accused, a diabetic, took an overdose of insulin which induced in
him a sort of dream-state. In another,52 hypoglycaemia was held
to have caused an aberrant mental state which resulted in an
aggressive but involuntary crime of grievous bodily harm. In
yet another,53 one Charlson was acquitted of causing grievous
bodily harm to his son where it was established that Charison's
throwing his son out of the window resulted from an uncontrollable outburst triggered by a cerebral tumor. The sum total
of these cases leads to the conclusion that automatism, because it
negates the actus reus, would be a most available defense to
chronic alcoholics who are charged with criminal conduct.
The courts have not been alone in recognizing the independant
and prior significance of actus reus in the ordering of criminal
law theory. The legislatures have been conscientious in this
regard too. The revised New York Penal Law of 1966 is about
the most current of the many modifications of the criminal law
that have been adopted. Its article 15, entitled Culpability, propounds dogma, concerning both mens rea and actus reus. It provides generally as to them that:
The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary
act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically
capable of performing. If such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an
49. King v. Cogdon (unreported) but see Norval Morris' statement of the
case in Somnabulistic Homocide, Spiders and North Koreans, 5 REs J DICATAE

29 (1951).
50. Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925); Fain v.
Commission, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213 (1879).
51. Bentley, The Times (London), July 19, 1960; 1960 Caim. L. R. 777.
52. Martin, The Times (London), Oct. 25, 1957. See Podolsky, The Chemlical Brew of Criminal Behavior, 45 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 675 (1955).
53. Regina v. Charlson, 1 W.L.R. 317, L. All E.R. 859, 119 J.P. 283 (1955).
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offense or some material element thereof does not require
a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense
is one of strict liability. If a culpable mental state on the
part of the actor is required with respect to every material
element of an offense, such offense is one of "mental culp'5 4
ability.
In an earlier section, the phrases "voluntary act" and "culpable
mental state" are defined. Note that these definitions attribute
a mental ingredient to both. "'Voluntary act' means a bodily
movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination. ''ss Culpable mental states include "intentionally" or
"knowingly" or "recklessly" or "with criminal negligence"'5 6 as
these terms are defined in later sections.
The paradigm for the New York Penal Code Revision and
almost all other similar revisions elsewhere during the past ten
years is the Model Penal Code, a work of monumental scholarship and considerable imagination. The Code's commentators
have interpreted section 2.01 to mean that "a person is not guilty
of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which
includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of
which he is physically capable." 57 Later sections relate to the
separate and distinct mens rea requirement.
Furthermore, the Model Penal Code is at pains to define the
meaning of voluntariness, even if it must do so by the indirect
method of exclusion. The following are not voluntary acts
within the view of the Model Penal Code: "a reflex or convulsion; a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion and
a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort
58
or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual."
This last exclusion of acts performed in an habitually unconscious state, in connection with a comment to the section by the
draftsmen, would seem to give no quarter to chronic alcoholism
as a method of eliminating the requisite mens rea.
54. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (1966).
55. Id. § 15.00 (2).
56. Id. § 15.00 (6).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE §

2.01, Comment at 119 (Tent. Draft 4, 1956).

58. Id. § 201, Comment at 11.
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But that, to my mind, contravenes the new and commendable
thrust of Driver and Easter. Those cases can be read expansively
to permit a defense of chronic alcoholism to any crime on the
theory that chronic alcoholism voids the voluntariness of the
actus reus; or they can be interpreted more narrowly 0 to approve the defense of chronic alcoholism to crimes of status, such
as vagrancy and public intoxication. This restricted reading
derives from the Robinson aversion to status criminality or, to
put it differently, criminality without regard to actus reus.
Easter and Driver, I might add, could also be viewed, as Mr.
Hutt has done,60 as having revitalized the defense of involuntary
intoxication. But, to me, that is merely another way of saying
that chronic alcoholism removes one's ability to have an actus
reus.
I fear that I have overstated my case and that I may unwittingly have betrayed myself by protesting too loudly and too
much, -which reminds me of the woeful tale of the old grand
dame who after sixty tranquil years of marriage to one man consulted a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining a divorce. The
lawyer was dutifully shocked. "But Madame," he asked, "has
your husband beaten you?" "The tenderest, most loving man
there ever was," she said. "Oh, he has another woman then?"
"At his age," she smiled in return. "Now of course you realize,"
said the lawyer, turning statesman, "that physical degeneration
of various parts of the anatomy is no grounds for divorce."
"Sonny," she said, "my husband is as virile as you are." "Then,
why, in God's name, do you want a divorce after sixty years?"
The response was immediate. "Enough is enough," she said.

59. One judge so reads Robinson. Kirbens, Not Guilty by Reason of Chronic

Alcoholism, 6 Mun CT. REV. 15 (July 1966).

60. Hutt & Merrill, Is the Alcoholic Immune From Criminal Prosecution,

6 MuN. CT. REv. 5 (July 1966).
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